Book Ten: 1812 - Chapter XXVIII

by Leo Tolstoy

　　Many historians say that the French did not win the battle ofBorodino because Napoleon had a cold, and that if he had not had acold the orders he gave before and during the battle would have beenstill more full of genius and Russia would have been lost and the faceof the world have been changed. To historians who believe thatRussia was shaped by the will of one man- Peter the Great- and thatFrance from a republic became an empire and French armies went toRussia at the will of one man- Napoleon- to say that Russia remained apower because Napoleon had a bad cold on the twenty-fourth of Augustmay seem logical and convincing.

　　If it had depended on Napoleon's will to fight or not to fight thebattle of Borodino, and if this or that other arrangement dependedon his will, then evidently a cold affecting the manifestation ofhis will might have saved Russia, and consequently the valet whoomitted to bring Napoleon his waterproof boots on the twenty-fourthwould have been the savior of Russia. Along that line of thoughtsuch a deduction is indubitable, as indubitable as the deductionVoltaire made in jest (without knowing what he was jesting at) when hesaw that the Massacre of St. Bartholomew was due to Charles IX'sstomach being deranged. But to men who do not admit that Russia wasformed by the will of one man, Peter I, or that the French Empirewas formed and the war with Russia begun by the will of one man,Napoleon, that argument seems not merely untrue and irrational, butcontrary to all human reality. To the question of what causes historicevents another answer presents itself, namely, that the course ofhuman events is predetermined from on high- depends on the coincidenceof the wills of all who take part in the events, and that a Napoleon'sinfluence on the course of these events is purely external andfictitious.

　　Strange as at first glance it may seem to suppose that theMassacre of St. Bartholomew was not due to Charles IX's will, thoughhe gave the order for it and thought it was done as a result of thatorder; and strange as it may seem to suppose that the slaughter ofeighty thousand men at Borodino was not due to Napoleon's will, thoughhe ordered the commencement and conduct of the battle and thought itwas done because he ordered it; strange as these suppositionsappear, yet human dignity- which tells me that each of us is, if notmore at least not less a man than the great Napoleon- demands theacceptance of that solution of the question, and historicinvestigation abundantly confirms it.

　　At the battle of Borodino Napoleon shot at no one and killed no one.That was all done by the soldiers. Therefore it was not he whokilled people.

　　The French soldiers went to kill and be killed at the battle ofBorodino not because of Napoleon's orders but by their own volition.The whole army- French, Italian, German, Polish, and Dutch- hungry,ragged, and weary of the campaign, felt at the sight of an armyblocking their road to Moscow that the wine was drawn and must bedrunk. Had Napoleon then forbidden them to fight the Russians, theywould have killed him and have proceeded to fight the Russians becauseit was inevitable.

　　When they heard Napoleon's proclamation offering them, ascompensation for mutilation and death, the words of posterity abouttheir having been in the battle before Moscow, they cried "Vivel'Empereur!" just as they had cried "Vive l'Empereur!" at the sight ofthe portrait of the boy piercing the terrestrial globe with a toystick, and just as they would have cried "Vive l'Empereur!" at anynonsense that might be told them. There was nothing left for them todo but cry "Vive l'Empereur!" and go to fight, in order to get foodand rest as conquerors in Moscow. So it was not because ofNapoleon's commands that they killed their fellow men.

　　And it was not Napoleon who directed the course of the battle, fornone of his orders were executed and during the battle he did not knowwhat was going on before him. So the way in which these peoplekilled one another was not decided by Napoleon's will but occurredindependently of him, in accord with the will of hundreds of thousandsof people who took part in the common action. It only seemed toNapoleon that it all took place by his will. And so the questionwhether he had or had not a cold has no more historic interest thanthe cold of the least of the transport soldiers.

　　Moreover, the assertion made by various writers that his cold wasthe cause of his dispositions not being as well planned as on formeroccasions, and of his orders during the battle not being as good aspreviously, is quite baseless, which again shows that Napoleon'scold on the twenty-sixth of August was unimportant.

　　The dispositions cited above are not at all worse, but are evenbetter, than previous dispositions by which he had won victories.His pseudo-orders during the battle were also no worse thanformerly, but much the same as usual. These dispositions and ordersonly seem worse than previous ones because the battle of Borodinowas the first Napoleon did not win. The profoundest and most excellentdispositions and orders seem very bad, and every learned militaristcriticizes them with looks oks importance, when they relate to abattle that has been lost, and the very worst dispositions andorders seem very good, and serious people fill whole volumes todemonstrate their merits, when they relate to a battle that has beenwon.

　　The dispositions drawn up by Weyrother for the battle ofAusterlitz were a model of perfection for that kind of composition,but still they were criticized- criticized for their veryperfection, for their excessive minuteness.

　　Napoleon at the battle of Borodino fulfilled his office asrepresentative of authority as well as, and even better than, at otherbattles. He did nothing harmful to the progress of the battle; heinclined to the most reasonable opinions, he made no confusion, didnot contradict himself, did not get frightened or run away from thefield of battle, but with his great tact and military experiencecarried out his role of appearing to command, calmly and with dignity.