Book Fourteen: 1812 - Chapter II

by Leo Tolstoy

　　One of the most obvious and advantageous departures from theso-called laws of war is the action of scattered groups against menpressed together in a mass. Such action always occurs in wars thattake on a national character. In such actions, instead of two crowdsopposing each other, the men disperse, attack singly, run away whenattacked by stronger forces, but again attack when opportunity offers.This was done by the guerrillas in Spain, by the mountain tribes inthe Caucasus, and by the Russians in 1812.

　　People have called this kind of war "guerrilla warfare" and assumethat by so calling it they have explained its meaning. But such awar does not fit in under any rule and is directly opposed to awell-known rule of tactics which is accepted as infallible. Thatrule says that an attacker should concentrate his forces in order tobe stronger than his opponent at the moment of conflict.

　　Guerrilla war (always successful, as history shows) directlyinfringes that rule.

　　This contradiction arises from the fact that military scienceassumes the strength of an army to be identical with its numbers.Military science says that the more troops the greater the strength.Les gros bataillons ont toujours raison.*

　　*Large battalions are always victorious.

　　For military science to say this is like defining momentum inmechanics by reference to the mass only: stating that momenta areequal or unequal to each other simply because the masses involvedare equal or unequal.

　　Momentum (quantity of motion) is the product of mass and velocity.

　　In military affairs the strength of an army is the product of itsmass and some unknown x.

　　Military science, seeing in history innumerable instances of thefact that the size of any army does not coincide with its strength andthat small detachments defeat larger ones, obscurely admits theexistence of this unknown factor and tries to discover it- now in ageometric formation, now in the equipment employed, now, and mostusually, in the genius of the commanders. But the assignment ofthese various meanings to the factor does not yield results whichaccord with the historic facts.

　　Yet it is only necessary to abandon the false view (adopted togratify the "heroes") of the efficacy of the directions issued inwartime by commanders, in order to find this unknown quantity.

　　That unknown quantity is the spirit of the army, that is to say, thegreater or lesser readiness to fight and face danger felt by all themen composing an army, quite independently of whether they are, or arenot, fighting under the command of a genius, in two- or three-lineformation, with cudgels or with rifles that repeat thirty times aminute. Men who want to fight will always put themselves in the mostadvantageous conditions for fighting.

　　The spirit of an army is the factor which multiplied by the massgives the resulting force. To define and express the significance ofthis unknown factor- the spirit of an army- is a problem for science.

　　This problem is only solvable if we cease arbitrarily tosubstitute for the unknown x itself the conditions under which thatforce becomes apparent- such as the commands of the general, theequipment employed, and so on- mistaking these for the realsignificance of the factor, and if we recognize this unknownquantity in its entirety as being the greater or lesser desire tofight and to face danger. Only then, expressing known historic factsby equations and comparing the relative significance of this factor,can we hope to define the unknown.

　　Ten men, battalions, or divisions, fighting fifteen men, battalions,or divisions, conquer- that is, kill or take captive- all theothers, while themselves losing four, so that on the one side four andon the other fifteen were lost. Consequently the four were equal tothe fifteen, and therefore 4x = 15y. Consequently x/y = 15/4. Thisequation does not give us the value of the unknown factor but gives usa ratio between two unknowns. And by bringing variously selectedhistoric units (battles, campaigns, periods of war) into suchequations, a series of numbers could be obtained in which certain lawsshould exist and might be discovered.

　　The tactical rule that an army should act in masses whenattacking, and in smaller groups in retreat, unconsciously confirmsthe truth that the strength of an army depends on its spirit. Tolead men forward under fire more discipline (obtainable only bymovement in masses) is needed than is needed to resist attacks. Butthis rule which leaves out of account the spirit of the armycontinually proves incorrect and is in particularly strikingcontrast to the facts when some strong rise or fall in the spirit ofthe troops occurs, as in all national wars.

　　The French, retreating in 1812- though according to tactics theyshould have separated into detachments to defend themselves-congregated into a mass because the spirit of the army had so fallenthat only the mass held the army together. The Russians, on thecontrary, ought according to tactics to have attacked in mass, butin fact they split up into small units, because their spirit had sorisen that separate individuals, without orders, dealt blows at theFrench without needing any compulsion to induce them to exposethemselves to hardships and dangers.