Book Eleven: 1812 - Chapter III

by Leo Tolstoy

　　When Ermolov, having been sent by Kutuzov to inspect the position,told the field marshal that it was impossible to fight there beforeMoscow and that they must retreat, Kutuzov looked at him in silence.

　　"Give me your hand," said he and, turning it over so as to feelthe pulse, added: "You are not well, my dear fellow. Think what youare saying!"

　　Kutuzov could not yet admit the possibility of retreating beyondMoscow without a battle.

　　On the Poklonny Hill, four miles from the Dorogomilov gate ofMoscow, Kutuzov got out of his carriage and sat down on a bench by theroadside. A great crowd of generals gathered round him, and CountRostopchin, who had come out from Moscow, joined them. Thisbrilliant company separated into several groups who all discussedthe advantages and disadvantages of the position, the state of thearmy, the plans suggested, the situation of Moscow, and militaryquestions generally. Though they had not been summoned for thepurpose, and though it was not so called, they all felt that thiswas really a council of war. The conversations all dealt with publicquestions. If anyone gave or asked for personal news, it was done in awhisper and they immediately reverted to general matters. No jokes, orlaughter, or smiles even, were seen among all these men. Theyevidently all made an effort to hold themselves at the height thesituation demanded. And all these groups, while talking amongthemselves, tried to keep near the commander in chief (whose benchformed the center of the gathering) and to speak so that he mightoverhear them. The commander in chief listened to what was beingsaid and sometimes asked them to repeat their remarks, but did nothimself take part in the conversations or express any opinion. Afterhearing what was being said by one or other of these groups hegenerally turned away with an air of disappointment, as though theywere not speaking of anything he wished to hear. Some discussed theposition that had been chosen, criticizing not the position itselfso much as the mental capacity of those who had chosen it. Othersargued that a mistake had been made earlier and that a battle shouldhave been fought two days before. Others again spoke of the battleof Salamanca, which was described by Crosart, a newly arrivedFrenchman in a Spanish uniform. (This Frenchman and one of theGerman princes serving with the Russian army were discussing the siegeof Saragossa and considering the possibility of defending Moscow ina similar manner.) Count Rostopchin was telling a fourth group that hewas prepared to die with the city train bands under the walls of thecapital, but that he still could not help regretting having beenleft in ignorance of what was happening, and that had he known itsooner things would have been different.... A fifth group,displaying the profundity of their strategic perceptions, discussedthe direction the troops would now have to take. A sixth group wastalking absolute nonsense. Kutuzov's expression grew more and morepreoccupied and gloomy. From all this talk he saw only one thing: thatto defend Moscow was a physical impossibility in the full meaning ofthose words, that is to say, so utterly impossible that if anysenseless commander were to give orders to fight, confusion wouldresult but the battle would still not take place. It would not takeplace because the commanders not merely all recognized the position tobe impossible, but in their conversations were only discussing whatwould happen after its inevitable abandonment. How could thecommanders lead their troops to a field of battle they considered itimpossible to hold? The lower-grade officers and even the soldiers(who too reason) also considered the position impossible and thereforecould not go to fight, fully convinced as they were of defeat. IfBennigsen insisted on the position being defended and others stilldiscussed it, the question was no longer important in itself butonly as a pretext for disputes and intrigue. This Kutuzov knew well.

　　Bennigsen, who had chosen the position, warmly displayed his Russianpatriotism (Kutuzov could not listen to this without wincing) byinsisting that Moscow must be defended. His aim was as clear asdaylight to Kutuzov: if the defense failed, to throw the blame onKutuzov who had brought the army as far as the Sparrow Hills withoutgiving battle; if it succeeded, to claim the success as his own; or ifbattle were not given, to clear himself of the crime of abandoningMoscow. But this intrigue did not now occupy the old man's mind. Oneterrible question absorbed him and to that question he heard noreply from anyone. The question for him now was: "Have I reallyallowed Napoleon to reach Moscow, and when did I do so? When was itdecided? Can it have been yesterday when I ordered Platov toretreat, or was it the evening before, when I had a nap and toldBennigsen to issue orders? Or was it earlier still?... When, whenwas this terrible affair decided? Moscow must be abandoned. The armymust retreat and the order to do so must be given." To give thatterrible order seemed to him equivalent to resigning the command ofthe army. And not only did he love power to which he was accustomed(the honours awarded to Prince Prozorovski, under whom he had servedin Turkey, galled him), but he was convinced that he was destined tosave Russia and that that was why, against the Emperor's wish and bythe will of the people, he had been chosen commander in chief. Hewas convinced that he alone could maintain command of the army inthese difficult circumstances, and that in all the world he alonecould encounter the invincible Napoleon without fear, and he washorrified at the thought of the order he had to issue. But somethinghad to be decided, and these conversations around him which wereassuming too free a character must be stopped.

　　He called the most important generals to him.

　　"My head, be it good or bad, must depend on itself," said he, risingfrom the bench, and he rode to Fili where his carriages were waiting.